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Abstract
In a combinatorial communication system, some signals consist of the combinations of other 
signals. Such systems are more efficient than equivalent, non-combinatorial systems, yet  despite 
this they are rare in nature. Why? Previous explanations have focused on the adaptive limits of 
combinatorial communication, or on its purported cognitive difficulties, but neither of these 
explains the full distribution of combinatorial communication in the natural world. Here we present 
a nonlinear dynamical model of the emergence of combinatorial communication that, unlike 
previous models, considers how initially  non-communicative behaviour evolves to take on a 
communicative function. We derive three basic principles about the emergence of combinatorial 
communication. We hence show that the interdependence of signals and responses places 
significant constraints on the historical pathways by which combinatorial signals might emerge, to 
the extent that anything other than the most simple form of combinatorial communication is 
extremely unlikely. We also argue that these constraints can be bypassed if individuals have the 
socio-cognitive capacity to engage in ostensive communication. Humans, but probably no other 
species, have this ability. This may explain why language, which is massively combinatorial, is such 
an extreme exception to nature’s general trend for non-combinatorial communication.
Keywords: animal signals, combinatorial communication, communication, evolution, language, 
ostension
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1. Introduction
In a combinatorial communication system, some signals consist of the combinations of other 
existing signals. The most basic version involves two individual signals that are combined to refer 
to something that is not simply the amalgamation of whatever the two individual signals refer to, 
but something different. In other words, combinatorial communication includes at least one 
composite signal, whereas in non-combinatorial communication, all the signals are holistic (figure 
1). For example, putty-nosed monkeys are reported to have two distinct alarm calls, one for each of 
two predators: leopards (a ‘pyow’ sound) and eagles (a ‘hack’ sound) [1,2]. When one or the other 
of these calls is produced on its own, the monkeys take appropriate evasive action: climbing up and 
into the trees for leopards; climbing down and into the bushes for eagles. However when the two 
calls are produced together (‘pyow-hack’), the effect  is not the simple combination of these i.e. the 
monkeys do not behave as if avoiding both types of predator. Instead, the call seems to presage the 
movement of the group to a new location (perhaps e.g. because there is a shortage of fresh food at 
the present location).
[figure 1 about here]
Combinatorial communication has one obvious adaptive advantage over equivalent non-
combinatorial systems: fewer elements are required to express the same number of possible 
messages, and so it allows information to be transferred more efficiently than in a system in which 
each signal has a distinct form [3]. Despite this potential advantage it  is rare in nature, and where it 
does exist it  is, with one salient exception, simple and limited [4,5]. Many systems (e.g. honeybee 
dance) have a signal which has an effect that is equal to the sum of its component parts, but very 
few have a signal whose effect is different to this sum (in the terms of figure 1, Z = X +Y is 
common, but Z ! X +Y is not). The salient exception is human language, which is massively 
combinatorial. Indeed, there are multiple different types of combination that can, along with other 
linguistic phenomena (syntax, phonetics, etc.), contribute to meaning. Otherwise the only  well-
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attested examples are the putty-nosed monkey case described above, and the quorum sensing 
communication of bacteria [6].
Why, then, is combinatorial communication so rare, and why is language such an extreme 
exception? One possible explanation might be that  combinatorial communication is cognitively 
challenging in some way [7,8]. However, why this should be the case is unclear: there is no 
particular reason to think that signal combinations should be difficult to process. On the contrary, 
the bacterial data suggests that it does not pose any significant cognitive challenges [6]. Other 
previous explanations have focused on the limits of the adaptive benefits of combinatorial 
communication. One analysis shows that the benefits associated with combinatorial communication 
are only realized when the total number of signals in the system exceeds a threshold level [3,9]. 
However, this prediction is not supported by  the data: several systems have many more signals than 
this threshold level, but still do not combine them (non-human primate gestural communication, for 
example [10]); and the putty-nosed monkey system described above has fewer signals than this 
threshold level, but is combinatorial nevertheless. Finally, one other analysis concludes that 
combinatorial systems are more susceptible to dishonesty than non-combinatorial systems [11]. 
However, this does not explain why language should be such a clear exception.
In this paper we develop a new explanation of the distribution of combinatorial 
communication in nature. The historical pathways by  which traits evolve are an important  source of 
constraint on biological form [12], yet most models of the evolution of communication, including 
all those focused on combinatorial communication, ask only  how one type of communicative 
system can evolve from another, and not how an initially  non-communicative behaviour can take on 
a communicative function. Specifically, previous models do not include strategies for signaller and 
receiver prior to the emergence of a signal, despite the fact that such prior strategies are likely to 
have considerable impact on the form of the eventual communication system [13,14]. We present a 
deterministic, nonlinear dynamical model that includes such strategies. We use this to derive a 
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number of principles regarding the origins of composite signals, and hence show that the emergence 
of composite signals is subject to significant historical constraints, to the extent that  even the most 
simple forms of combinatorial communication are likely  to be uncommon, and anything more 
complex vanishingly so. We then argue that these constraints can be bypassed if a species has the 
social cognitive abilities to communicate ostensively i.e. in a way that  involves the expression and 
recognition of communicative and informative intentions. Humans, but probably no other species, 
have this ability.
2. The emergence of communication
Before we present the model, it is necessary to briefly describe the two classic ways in 
which communication systems can emerge. In general, new signals emerge through either 
ritualisation or sensory manipulation (also called sensory exploitation) [14-16]. In ritualisation, 
previously  existing cues are exapted for use as signals (a cue is a behaviour that is informative for 
other organisms, but was not  selected to be so [15,17]). For example, the use of urine to mark 
territorial boundaries probably first began when animals urinated simply through fear, when they 
were at the edge of familiar territory. This acted as a cue to other animals, who make use of that 
information. This in turn provides a selection pressure on the focal organism to urinate when and if 
it wants/needs to inform others about the range of its territory. In sensory manipulation, previously 
existing behaviour is exapted for use as a response. For example, male scorpion!ies capture large 
prey and then offer them to females who feed on them during copulation [18]. The offering of prey 
by the male probably initially evolved because the female had a pre-existing mechanism that 
prioritized the opportunity to feed on large prey, and so the presentation of food gave the male an 
opportunity to mate. There was then later positive selection on the female to accept the prey  in 
exchange for copulation [15].
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These processes, ritualisation and sensory manipulation, constrain the form that new signals 
can take. Our previous model showed that if a particular behaviour does not exist  for reasons 
independent of communication prior to either of these processes occurring, then it  cannot become a 
signal or response, regardless of its adaptive value for signaller or receiver [14]. Prospective signals 
and responses must already  provide fitness benefits to either receiver or signaller, respectively, if 
they  are to actually  evolve into signals/responses. In other words, there must be some sort of trigger, 
external to the (proto-)communicative interaction (i.e. either a cue or a coercive behaviour), to 
cause a signal to actually emerge. With this background in place, we now develop a formal model 
of the emergence of specifically combinatorial communication systems.
3. Basic set up of model, and classification of communication systems
 The environment can be in any  one of a number of different states, E ! . Given this state, 
one agent (the actor) performs an action, A(E) ! 풜. Another agent (the reactor) then performs a 
reaction, R(A) ! . Payoffs are determined by the different combinations of states and reactions. 
This much is the same as the standard game-theoretic approach to modelling communication. 
However we differ from the standard approach in our specification of the sets , 풜, and . In 
particular, in our model these sets include default settings (E0, A0 and R0), which correspond to the 
agents doing nothing, and which are orthogonal to all other members of the set. Typically, these 
default settings are not included in game-theoretic models of communication. However, they are 
critical to understanding how communication can emerge from a state of non-communication [14].
 With the exception of the defaults E0 and A0, environments and actions can be combined 
with other environments and actions. We denote these composites as Ei " Ej and Ai " Aj 
respectively. These composites are, like their component  parts, members of  and 풜 respectively, 
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and composition is commutative (i.e. order does not matter, so Ei " Ej = Ej " Ei and Ai " Aj = Aj " 
Ai).
 A(E) and R(A) are deterministic functions of E and A respectively. Together they  comprise 
an agent’s strategy. If there are non-composite environments Ei and Ej in which the actions Ai and Aj 
are performed, then the composite action Ai " Aj is performed in the composite environment Ei " Ej. 
Two agents are members of the same species if they share the same functions A and R for all 
possible environments and actions respectively (i.e. two individuals i and j are members of the same 
species " Ai(E) = Aj(E)  E and Ri(A) = Rj(A)  A).
 A signal is any non-default action which yields a non-default reaction, and any such reaction 
is called a response. A communication system is a set of more than one signal-response pair. Within 
a communication system, each given pair of actions Ai and Aj (where both ! A0) can be classified in 
one of three ways:
• non-composite: a pair is non-composite if the composite of the two actions is produced only 
in composite environments, and it  in turn yields the default reaction i.e. there is no Ek # Ei " 
Ej such that A(Ek) = Ai " Aj, and R(Ai " Aj) = R0.
• pseudo-composite: a pair is pseudo-composite if the composite of the two actions is 
produced only in composite environments, and it in turn yields a non-default reaction i.e. 
there is no Ek # Ei " Ej such that A(Ek) = Ai " Aj, while at the same time R(Ai " Aj) # R0.
• fully-composite: a pair is fully-composite if the composite of the two actions is produced in 
at least one non-composite environment, and it in turn yields a non-default reaction i.e. Ek 
# Ei " Ej such that A(Ek) = Ai " Aj, and R(Ai " Aj) # R0. A combinatorial communication 
system is a system that includes at least one pair of fully-composite actions.
(Logically, there is a fourth possible class, where the composite of two actions is produced in at 
least one non-composite environment, and it in turn yields the default reaction. However, such a 
pair is unstable, since the default reaction produces only  a zero payoff for the actor, by definition, 
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and this is outweighed by  the maintenance and production costs of the composite pair. We therefore 
ignore this possibility in the subsequent analysis.)
 Communication is vulnerable to an instability caused by  dishonesty. How communication 
systems remain stable in the face of this problem is an important and much studied question for the 
evolution of communication [15,19]. Here, however, we are concerned with a different question, 
namely: assuming that communication is evolutionarily stable, what are the different evolutionary 
pathways by  which (combinatorial) communication can emerge? We thus wish to avoid issues of 
stability, which might complicate our analysis, and so we assume that  at least one of the different 
mechanisms that can stabilise communication is in place. In particular, we find that ascribing a 
direct benefit for successful communication to both signaller and receiver [as in e.g. 20,21], or 
imposing kin discrimination (i.e. agents can observe the actions of their conspecifics only), leads to 
the same set of dynamical equations (see Supplementary Information). We expect other possible 
mechanisms to lead to the same or similar principles for the emergence of combinatorial 
communication as those we set out below.
4. Dynamics
 We now derive the dynamics for the model. The basic principles of the model are that: the 
frequency of a particular environment is given by f(E); if an agent performs a reaction R in 
environment E, there is a payoff s(R|E); the actor must also receive a payoff, either directly  or 
indirectly, for communication to be stable (see above); and there is a cost associated with each 
agent’s strategy i.e. the cost of having the capacity to behave in a non-default way in the first  place 
(this is ! for actions and " for reactions; see below). This is distinct from the cost associated with 
each individual behaviour, which we include as part of the payoff s(R|E). These two types of cost 
can be thought of as maintenance costs and energy costs respectively, and the inclusion of both is an 
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important difference between our model and previous models of the emergence of communication 
[e.g. 20,21].
 We first write down the dynamical equations for the frequencies of the various strategies in 
the population, and we define "(A,E) as the fraction of agents who perform action A in environment 
E, and #(R,A) as the fraction of agents who perform reaction R in response to action A. As we show 
in the Supplementary Information, we have:
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     (1)
($ is the Kronecker delta symbol, which equals 1 if the two arguments are identical, and 0 
otherwise.) The equation has the same structure as the replicator equation in standard evolutionary 
game theory [22], in which u(A,E) is the fitness of the rule E%A. There are three contributions to 
this fitness:
• The first term gives the fitness of the rule E%A in the environment E, given the current 
distribution of the possible rules R(A).
• The second term gives the net fitness of the rule E%A in all the composite environments 
that include E, given the current distribution of the possible rules R(A). This term is unique 
to composite signals. It has the consequence that the spontaneous emergence of composite 
signalling strategies (either actions or reactions) can be favourable.
• The third term accounts for the cost, 흌$ of having a mechanism for producing non-default 
actions.
Similarly, for the frequency #(R,A) of the rule A$R, we get:
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As above, there are three terms to this equation, which correspond to: the fitness of the rule A%R in 
non-composite environments; the average fitness of a composite action A = A1 " A2 performed in 
composite environments; and the cost, !, of having a mechanism for producing non-default 
reactions. Also as above, we derive this equation step-by-step in the Supplementary Information.
 These equations can be applied to any specific set of components i.e. states of the 
environment; possible actions and reactions; and parameters. In the Supplementary Information we 
define these components for a specific model, in order to test the general predictions we derive 
below. Its results are entirely consistent with the principles we set out below.
5. Three basic principles for the emergence of combinatorial communication systems
 We now derive three basic principles that govern how a combinatorial communication 
system might emerge. We are interested, primarily, in the case where two actions, Ai and Aj, are 
composed to become the action that is used to signal an elementary  environmental state Ek that is 
unrelated to Ei and Ej. We will not discuss higher-order composite actions (i.e. those where one or 
both components are themselves composite actions), but we have no reason to think that the general 
principles we derive here should be any different in that case.
Principle 1: Only homogeneous populations are evolutionarily stable.
 For any  given environmental state, the fitness, u(A,E), of each action rule is independent of 
the frequencies, %(A&,E), of its competitors. The action rule with the highest fitness will then grow 
at the expense of all its competitors until it is the only one remaining. If two or more rules have the 
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same fitness as each other, drift will likewise eliminate all but one of them. These observations also 
applies to reaction rules. Hence, only homogeneous populations, in which all agents have the same 
set of rules, are evolutionarily stable. We thus assume homogenous populations in what follows.
Principle 2: New non-composite signals cannot emerge without an external trigger.
 Given some pre-existing signalling system, a new non-composite signal is the action, A, in 
the set of rules E%A%R (A # A0, R # R0), where: (i) there is currently no environment in which the 
new action A is performed; (ii) A is not a composite of any  two existing actions in the system and 
(iii) the existing reaction to A, produced by  itself or in combination with any other action A&, is the 
default reaction. In a homogeneous population (see principle 1), condition (i) implies that  the first 
term in equation (2) vanishes for both v(R,A) and v(R0,A) because "(A,E) = 0 for all E; condition 
(ii) implies that the second term in equation (2) also vanishes for both v(R,A) and v(R0,A), because 
'(Ai ( Aj, A) = 0 for all Ai, Aj; and condition (iii) implies that the first two terms of equation (1) are 
the same for both u(A,E) and u(A0,E) because #(R&,A) = #(R&, A ( A&) = '(R&,R0) for all A&. 
Consequently, for any new non-composite signalling behaviour, we always have that:
 u(A,E) - u(A0,E) = - ! in any environment
% v(R,A) - v(R0,A) = - "
In other words, adding either the action or reaction component of this signalling behaviour carries a 
cost for every  individual in the population. Hence a completely new signalling behaviour, that 
involves an action that is not currently  part of the signalling system, cannot emerge without some 
external trigger as described in §2. This result  is an extension of our previous result, that a signal 
cannot be added to an existing state of non-communication without an external trigger (cue or 
coercion) [14]. The observation here is that this issue also applies to the addition of a any non-
composite signal to an existing communication system. This point will be important when we 
discuss human linguistic communication, in §7, below.
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Principle 3: New composite signals can emerge without an external trigger.
 Consider a pair of existing signals, Ai and Aj. If there is an environment where the 
combination of these two signals would provide a cue (useful information) for other organisms, 
then their co-production can lead to the evolution of a composite signal. More formally, if the 
environments Ei and Ej trigger the actions Ai and Aj, respectively, then the composite environment 
Ei ( Ej will trigger the composite action Ai ( Aj. Repeating the analysis from principle (2), we find, 
again, that adding a new action will be costly for all individuals in the population i.e. that u(Ai ( 
Aj,Ek) - u(A0, Ei ( Ej) = -!&for all E, as before. As with principle (2), this prevents the emergence of 
a composite signal by sensory manipulation. However unlike principle (2), the emergence of a 
composite signal by ritualization is possible. That is, there may be a reaction that is not yet an 
existing reaction to either Ai or Aj, and which would be beneficial for the receiver to perform in the 
composite environment i.e. it is possible for v(R,A) - v(R0,A) > 0 for some R. If this condition is 
satisfied, then, assuming that the relevant environments occur sufficiently  often for evolution to 
occur, we should expect the corresponding reaction to evolve. We will then have arrived at a 
pseudo-composite signal: (Ei ( Ej) $ (Ai ( Aj) % R # R0. The key observation here is that the co-
production of two existing signals can itself be the trigger required for a new signal to emerge. This 
possibility is absent in the case of non-composite signals. Note that  from here, it  is then possible for 
a new rule Ek # (Ei ( Ej) $ (Ai ( Aj) to emerge by sensory manipulation, giving us a fully-
composite signal. A concrete demonstration of this possibility is given in the Supplementary 
Information, where we apply our model to the specific case of putty-nosed monkey alarm calls. 
Note, however, that the emergence of a full-composite signal is not guaranteed (it  is possible, for 
example, that reactions to higher-order compositions could prevent this).
6. Why combinatorial communication should be rare
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What do these principles imply  for the emergence of a combinatorial communication 
system? One immediate observation is that they explain how fully-composite signals can emerge 
even in a simple world of just two existing signals. This is noteworthy because it is contrary to a 
previous analysis, which argued that composite signals should only emerge within systems of 
multiple (>5) signals [3]. However, the present empirical data suggest, consistent with our analysis, 
that composite signals can exist even in very simple systems (see e.g. the putty-nosed monkey 
system described in §1).
Another observation might be that the three principles derived above seem to imply that 
composite signals should be far more common than non-composite signals. After all, composite 
signals can emerge without an external trigger (principle 3), but non-composite signals cannot 
(principle 2). However, this reading fails to take account of the conditions attached to each of these 
possibilities. There are two in particular that we wish to highlight.
The first is the relative frequency  by which the various triggers of the emergence of 
composite and non-composite signals occur. In particular, although the emergence of a composite 
signal does not require a trigger external to the system itself, it  does require one from within the 
system. This condition is sufficiently  stringent that the emergence of a composite signal is in fact 
less likely to occur than the external triggers that are required for the emergence of non-composite 
signals. Here is why. The internal trigger required for the emergence of a new composite signal is a 
very specific one: that, given the co-production of two existing signals, Ai and Aj, then there is a 
reaction R that: (i) if it were performed in the composite environmental state Ei ( Ej, it would be 
beneficial to the receiver; and (ii) that this reaction is not  yet an existing reaction to either Ai or Aj 
(see principle 3). In other, more information-centric terms, what is required is that the co-production 
of two existing signals must be informative about some aspect  of the world, beyond what can be 
deduced from the meanings of the individual signals themselves - and there is no particular reason 
why this should be the case. In contrast, a new non-composite signal can emerge from any 
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behaviour that an individual might perform (see §2). In other words, there is one specific way that 
any new signal might be composite, but a vast number of ways, limited only by the number of 
behaviours the organism can actually  perform, that any  new signal might be non-composite. 
Consequently, composite signals should be rare. This is not to say  that they cannot emerge, only 
that their emergence is dependent upon unlikely  prior circumstances. Hence, they  should be rare, at 
least in comparison with non-composite signals.
The second condition attached to the emergence of fully-composite signals is that it  is 
dependent upon the instability of other possible systems. Consider a basic system of Ei  $ Ai % Ri 
and Ej $ Aj % Rj (i.e. just the first two signals in figure 1). Principle 3 states that it  is then possible 
for a fully-composite signal Ek $ (Ai ( Aj) % Rk to emerge, to form the system described in figure 
1, without an external trigger. However, it turns out that  this is only true if the alternative system, of 
the basic system plus a holistic signal Ek $ Ak % Rk is unstable. Here is why. In order for the 
process described in principle 3 to occur, the basic system must be unstable to the addition of (Ai ( 
Aj) % Rk. A necessary  condition for this to be the case is that in this system, v(Rk,Ai ( Aj) > v(R0,Ai 
(Aj). Using the equation for v(R,A) in §4, we find that for this instability to be present, we require:
f(Ei (Ej) [s(Rk | Ei (Ej) - s(R0 | Ei (Ej)] - " > 0    (3)
However, using the same equation for v(R,A), but now applied to the alternative system (i.e. the one 
that includes Ek $ Ak % Rk rather than Ek $ (Ai ( Aj) % Rk) we find that for this alternative system 
to be stable we require:
 f(Ei (Ej) [s(Rk | Ei (Ej) - s(R0 | Ei (Ej)] - " < 0    (4)
The equations (3) and (4) clearly  contradict each other. This shows that the conditions required for 
the process described in principle 3 to occur include that  the alternative system is evolutionarily 
unstable (note that this is true whether or not the fully-compositional system described in figure 1 is 
evolutionarily stable). As such, this is an additional criterion on the emergence of composite signals, 
and hence on the emergence of combinatorial communication.
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 In sum, there are at least two conditions that can work to restrict the emergence of 
composite signals. The first is that the triggers required for the emergence of composite signals are 
less likely to occur than are the triggers for non-composite signals. The second is that the process of 
emergence without an external trigger depends upon the instability of any alternative, holistic 
system. Both these conditions are the consequence of the interdependence of signals and responses, 
and they help to explain why combinatorial communication is rare in nature.
7. Human linguistic communication
There is, of course, one extreme exception to the norm of non-combinatorial 
communication: human linguistic communication. Here, meaningless sounds (phonemes) are 
combined into meaningful units (morphemes), which are in turn combined into utterances, whose 
meaning is a function not  only  of the morphemes involved, but also the order in which they are 
combined [a feature called duality of patterning: 23,24]. This combinatorial richness gives language 
its expressive power [5,25]. How can we explain why language is such a clear exception to the 
general trend for non-combinatorial systems? In this section we use the conclusions from our model 
to pinpoint and articulate an important difference between human and animal communication. We 
hence argue that human linguistic communication is simply not subject to the various historical 
contingencies described in the previous sections - and consequently, combinatorial communication 
is free to emerge wherever it may be useful.
Human communication depends, at  bottom, upon mechanisms of metapsychology: that is, 
the ability to reason about others’ reasons, intentions, beliefs, and so on. Communication of this sort 
is called ostensive communication [26]. Linguistic communication is an instance of ostensive 
communication that has been made expressively  powerful by the development of rich suite of 
communicative conventions that allow it to be used far more precisely and expressively than it 
otherwise would [27]. A signaller can, for example, ostensively point to any of the objects in this 
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room, but with language she can refer to any object in the world. She also can make a request of 
others by, for example ostensively pushing unchopped vegetables, and a knife, in their direction, but 
with language she can make requests about things remote in time and space. Other examples are not 
hard to imagine. In contrast, most, and perhaps all, animal communication depends upon 
mechanisms of association: causal relationships between stimuli and responses (but see below). 
Communication of this sort is called coded communication [see refs. 26-28 for discussion of the 
difference between coded and ostensive communication].
Our model in this paper has been a model of coded communication: we have studied how 
states of the world become associated with certain actions, and how these actions in turn become 
associated with certain reactions. Indeed, all models of animal communication that  study the 
emergence of such associations are code models. However, such models do not capture an 
important fact about ostensive communication: that meaning is not deduced or calculated, even 
probabilistically, on the back of associations (be they between signal and meaning, or perhaps 
between signals, context, and meaning), but rather it  is inferred, based on the receiver’s beliefs 
about the signaller’s intentions [26]. This inference is, unlike the associations that make coded 
communication possible, made possible by metapsychology [28].
One consequence of this difference is that human ostensive communication, including 
linguistic communication, is inherently prone to ambiguity. This is generally seen as a defective 
quality, because it can, on occasion, lead to misunderstanding and other failures of communication. 
However, it also allows communication to be used in flexible, creative, and open-ended ways - and 
these ways include the combination of already existing signals. One consequence of this is that the 
spaces of possible signal forms and signal meanings become continuous, rather than discrete. This 
development is possible only because signaller have the metapsychological abilities to create the 
right sort of signal to express their intended meaning, whatever it might be, and because receivers 
have similar abilities to infer those intended meanings.
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Here is an example. Homesigners are deaf children born to hearing parents. Lacking the 
input of a conventional sign language, they must create new communication systems themselves, 
and this includes the combination of existing signals [29]. Here is one very simple case [ibid.]. The 
child, Karen, is already  familiar with pointing, and also with a ‘twist’ gesture that means ‘open’. 
She then uses these two behaviours together: she points to a jar of soap bubbles and then, without 
pausing, produces an iconic ‘twist’ action with her hands. In doing so, she indicates to the adult that 
she would like her to open the jar. At first blush this seems unremarkable, but that is only because, 
as fluent users of ostensive communication, we are fully  accustomed to such acts of creation as an 
everyday occurrence. The point here is not that we can combine things together. It is rather that, 
because she has the required metapsychological abilities, it  is possible for Karen to provide just the 
right sort of evidence, given her intended meaning and her intended audience. This is ostensive 
communication. It just happens that in this case the right sort of evidence happens to involve the 
combination of two existing signals.
Note that in a different context, the meaning of Karen’s behaviour could be very different 
indeed. Suppose, for example, that  the adult had just tried to open the jar by twisting it, but  had 
failed, and that this had amused Karen. Now Karen could use the same combined signal to make a 
humorous reference to this past event. This flexibility is possible only because both Karen and the 
adult have the metapsychological abilities required. On the ostensive side, Karen produced the 
signals in such a way that it was apparent that they  are in fact one signal, comprised of two parts; 
this is why she does not pause between the two. On the inferential side, the adult must  assess what 
Karen’s intended meaning was, given her knowledge of the context, and of the meanings of the two 
component parts.
Here is how this example relates to our model. Karen has an existing set of actions that she 
produces in particular environments, and these receive particular responses from the adult. 
Specifically:
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E1 = Karen wants to refer to an out-of-reach object
A1 = pointing
R1 = attention is focused in the direction of the point
E2 = Karen wants the adult to open something
A2 = ‘twist’ gesture
R2 = the adult opens the object of mutual attention.
Karen finds herself in a new environment: E3 = Karen wants the adult to open an out-of-reach 
object. Note that this environment is not the sum of the other two: E3 # E1 " E2. Instead, the 
composite environment E1 " E2 is the co-occurrence of (i) an object that  is out-of-reach object; and 
(ii) an object that Karen wishes to open. There is nothing in this that specifies that these two objects 
should in fact be the same object: that aspect of the scenario is additional, and as such is specific to 
E3. Our model shows that, without an external trigger to set the evolutionary  process in motion, it is 
not possible, in a coded communication system, for a new, non-composite signal like this to emerge 
(principle 2, above). Yet  here, not only does such a signal emerge, it does so immediately, and 
smoothly: there is no interruption of the normal flow of communication. Neither is this an instance 
of the emergence of communication by ritualization, in which a cue evolves into a signal (see 
principle 3, above) - because Karen’s behaviour is not a cue. It  is a signal from the moment of its 
production, and that is the point. As such, this is a clear exception to the general constraints 
described previously. In sum, the existence of ostensive communication makes it  possible for a 
species to overcome the constraints, described above, that  otherwise make the emergence of 
combinatorial communication unlikely.
There is, then, an important sense in which Karen’s twist signal contrasts with, say, bacterial 
quorum sensing, or the putty-nosed monkey case. Systems like that, which appear to be cases of 
coded communication, are in a sense not really  combinatorial at all. After all, there is no 
‘combining’ going on. There is really just a third holistic signal, which happens to be comprised of 
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the same pieces as other existing holistic signals. Indeed, the most recent experimental results 
suggest that the putty-nosed monkeys interpret the ‘combinatorial’ pyow-hack calls in exactly this 
idiomatic way, rather than as the product of two component parts of meaning [30]. In contrast, the 
ostensive creation of new composite signals is clearly combinatorial: the meaning of the new, 
composite signal is in part (but only in part) a function of the meanings of the component pieces.
It is presently unclear whether any other species uses ostensive communication. The precise 
psychological mechanisms necessary are cognitively  complex, and so it is quite possible that it is 
uniquely human [31-33]. Certainly, this would be consistent with the argument we have developed 
in this paper, and there is presently no convincing evidence that any other species communicates 
ostensively [31,33]. However, this remains, at least for now, an open empirical question. (Note that 
ostensive communication is not the same thing as intentional communication, which some other 
species certainly do use.)
8. Conclusion
Previous models of the emergence of combinatorial communication were focused upon the 
following question: under what circumstances are composite signals advantageous, in comparison 
with holistic signals? Our model in this paper addresses a different question: by  what processes can 
composite signals emerge? To do this, we explicitly  modeled the possibility  that no communication 
might take place: this is why our model includes the default states E0, A0 and R0, which are absent 
from other models. Our results show that combinatorial communication is rare in nature because the 
interdependence of signals and responses constrains the ways by which communication systems 
emerge, with the effect that novel signals will tend to be holistic rather than composite. However, 
this constraint can be bypassed if the communication system in question is ostensive - and this type 
of communication is likely unique to humans. Unlike other proposals (see Introduction), this 
explanation is consistent with all the empirical facts: it explains both why combinatorial 
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communication is generally  rare in the natural world, and why there is a single, extreme exception 
to this trend.
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Figure legend
Figure 1: Combinatorial communication.
In a combinatorial communication system, two (or more) holistic signals (A and B in this figure) are 
combined to form a third, composite signal (A + B), which has a different effect (Z) to the sum of 
the two individual signals (X + Y). This figure illustrates the simplest combinatorial communication 
system possible. Applied to the putty-nosed monkey  system, the symbols in this figure are: a = 
presence of eagles; b = presence of leopards; c = absence of food; A = ‘pyow’; B = ‘hack’ call; C = 
A + B = ‘pyow-hack’; X = climb down; Y = climb up; Z # X + Y = move to a new location. 
Combinatorial communication is rare in nature: many  systems have a signal C = A + B with an 
effect Z = X + Y; very few have a signal C = A + B with an effect Z # X + Y.
24
A 
B 
C ! A + B
signal 
a 
b 
c ! a + b
state of 
world 
X 
Y 
Z ! X + Y
effect 
A 
B 
C = A + B
a 
b 
c ! a + b
X 
Y 
Z ! X + Y
combinatorial 
communication
non-combinatorial 
communication
Why is combinatorial communication rare in the natural world,
and why is language an exception to this trend?
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1 Replicator equations for composite signalling strategies
In evolutionary game theory, the dynamics of a strategy S in a population is governed by the replica-
tor equation [1]
dx(S)
dt
= x(S)
[
f(S; {x})−
∑
S′
x(S′)f(S′; {x})
]
(S1)
where x(S) is the frequency of the strategy S in the population, f(S; {x}) is the growth rate of
agents with that strategy given the frequencies of all other strategies in the population, and the sum
is over the set of strategies S′ that are in direct competition with S (including S itself).
In a model of communication, there are many different sets of competing strategies. First, the action,
A, performed by an agent, α, can vary according to the state of the environment, E. We assume that
a single action Aα(E) is performed by agent α whenever the environment is in state E: previous
work on communication [2, 3] has shown that probabilistic strategies (where more than one action
might be performed in a given environment) are not evolutionarily stable. Thus, if ψ(A,E) is the
frequency of agents that perform action A in environment E, we have the replicator equation
d
dt
ψ(A,E) = ψ(A,E)
[
u(A,E)−
∑
A′∈A
ψ(A′, E)u(A′, E)
]
(S2)
where the sum is over all elements of the set,A, of all possible actions and their composites. u(A,E)
is the growth rate of the action strategy E → A and depends on the frequencies of all other strategies
in the population. In the model of composite communication described in the main text, we assume
that the action performed in an composite environment E1 ◦ E2 is the composite of the actions
performed in the environments separately, i.e., Aα(E1) ◦ Aα(E2) for agent α. This means that the
frequencies ψ(A,E) are explicitly defined for those environmental states E that are not composites.
The situation for reactions is directly analogous: for each action A that is performed, an agent can
perform a single reaction R: for each action, the different possible reactions compete with one an-
other. Hence we have
d
dt
φ(R,A) = φ(R,A)
[
v(R,A)−
∑
R′∈R
φ(R′, A)v(R,A)
]
(S3)
where here φ(R,A) is the frequency of the reaction strategy A → R in the population, R is the set
of all possible reactions and v(R,A) is the growth rate of that strategy which again depends on the
frequencies of all other strategies in the population.
The crucial question, then, is what form the fitnesses u(A,E) and v(R,A) should take. First, we
associate the growth rate s(R|E) with reaction R in environment E (which may include composite
environments). We also assign a cost cα to an agent for maintaining a given set of signalling strate-
gies. For simplicity, we assume that each non-default action strategy (i.e., environment E for which
Aα(E) 6= A0) costs an amount χ and that each non-default reaction strategy (i.e., action A for which
Rα(A) 6= R0) costs an amount η. We further assume the state E is present a fraction f(E) of the
time. Finally, if qα(R,E) is the probability that agent α performs the reaction R in environment E
as a consequence of some other agent performing an appropriate action, the mean rate of offspring
production (fitness) of that individual is
sα =
∑
E,R
f(E)s(R|E)qα(R,E)− cα . (S4)
The fitnesses u(A,E) and v(R,A) are then obtained by averaging over the set of individuals who
have the specific strategy E → A or A→ R.
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There are two approaches that can be taken to calculate these fitnesses that lead to exactly the same
outcome. The first is to assume, as in [2, 3], that all agents can observe the behaviour of all other
agents (i.e., the population is spatially well-mixed) and that signallers receive the same payoff,
s(R|E), as the agents who respond to their signals. The second is instead to assume that agents
can only observe the behaviour of conspecifics (i.e., those with the same action and reaction strate-
gies), thereby leading to an indirect benefit for actors who also perform the corresponding reaction.
In order that different strategies may compete with one another, we further require in this case that
recombination is efficient, so that the fraction of individuals with two particular strategies is given
by the product of their individual frequencies. Below, we show that these two approaches—which
amount to different ways to ensure the stability of cooperative behaviour in the population—lead to
the same dynamics.
1.1 Direct benefit to both signaller and receiver in a spatially-mixed population
We consider first the case where an agent can observe the behaviour of all other agents, and the payoff
for performing a reaction R in environment E is passed on from the reactor to actor.
The easiest fitness to evaluate is v(R,A), i.e., that for a reaction strategy A → R. This is because
the payoff for performing a reaction is direct. There are three contributions to this quantity. The first
comes from actors who perform A in a (non-composite) environmental state E. These actors make
up a proportion ψ(A,E) of the population, so under the assumption that agents are spatially-mixed,
the probability q(R,E) that a reactor interacts with such an actor is ψ(A,E). This first contribution
is then simply
v(1)(R,A) =
∑
E
f(E)s(R|E)ψ(A,E) .
Now we have to take into account that, if A is a composite action A1 ◦ A2, it may be performed
in the composite environment E1 ◦ E2. In a spatially well-mixed population, the probability that a
randomly chosen actor behaves in this way is φ(A1, E1)φ(A2, E2). To decide if a given combination
of actions A1 ◦ A2 is equivalent to A, we employ the Kronecker delta symbol δ(A1 ◦ A2, A), which
equals 1 if the two arguments are equal, and zero otherwise. Then, we find
v(2)(R,A) =
∑
〈E1,E2〉
f(E1 ◦ E2)s(R|E1 ◦ E2)
∑
A1,A2
ψ(A1, E1)ψ(A2, E2)δ(A1 ◦A2, A)
where 〈E1, E2〉 denotes a sum over distinct pairs of non-default, non-composite environmental states.
The final contribution to the fitness comes from the fact that maintaining each non-default reaction
decreases the payoff by an amount η, no matter what behaviour the agent actually engages in. Since
only fitness differences matter, we can equally ascribe a fitness benefit to the default reaction of η,
again by using the Kronecker delta symbol:
v(3)(R,A) = ηδ(R,R0) .
Adding these three terms together gives the expression quoted in the main text.
We now turn to the fitness u(A,E) of the action strategy E → A. To do this we need to identify the
mean growth rate of agents employing the strategies A → R for fixed A but variable R. Again, this
has three contributions. First, the probability q(R,E) that a randomly chosen reactor exhibits the
reaction R to the action A in environment E is φ(R,A). Hence, the first contribution to the fitness is
u(1)(A,E) = f(E)
∑
R
φ(R,A)s(R|E) .
The second contribution comes from the case where the environmental state E co-occurs with some
other state E′ (which is distinct from E′ and E0). In the composite state E ◦ E′, the probability that
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the composite action A ◦A′ is observed by a randomly-chosen reactor is ψ(A′, E′), given that action
A is already performed by some actor. The probability that reactor also performs the reaction R to
A ◦A′ is φ(R,A ◦A′). Hence, the second contribution to the fitness is
u(2)(A,E) =
∑
E′ 6=E0,E
f(E ◦ E′)
∑
R
∑
A′
φ(R,A ◦A′)ψ(A′, E′)s(R|E ◦ E′) . (S5)
Finally, we can assign a fitness advantage to the default strategy A0 via
u(3)(A,E) = χδ(A,A0) .
Again, summing these three contributions together we obtain the expression for u(A,E) given in the
main text.
1.2 Indirect benefit through kin discrimination with random mating
The foregoing expressions for the fitnesses were obtained by using the fact that, when an actor or
reactor is chosen at random from the population, the probability that it has a given strategy E → A
or A → R is just given by the frequency of that strategy in the population, ψ(A,E) or φ(R,A).
This is appropriate when agents are well mixed in space. An alternative approach is to assume that
agents interact only with their conspecifics. Then, when considering an agent as an actor with the
strategy A → E, for example, and asking whether a reactor that agent interacts with exhibits the
strategy A→ R, this is equivalent to asking whether that same actor also has the strategy A→ R. In
principle, strong correlations could build up between different strategies. However, if we assume that
some mating process acts so that offspring acquire random combinations of parents’ strategies, and
that this process acts sufficiently quickly that it reaches equilibrium on the timescale of the growth
dynamics, then the probability that an agent has the strategy A → R, say, is φ(R,A) no matter
what other strategies it may possess. Thus, asking questions about a single agent in this picture is
equivalent to asking those same questions about randomly-chosen agents in the previous section.
Hence, the fitnesses that arise from this approach are exactly equivalent. It is possible to show this
more formally by deriving the replicator dynamics from first principles using, e.g., the Price equation
[4, 5] as a starting point.
1.3 Conditions for evolutionary stability
Evolutionarily stable strategies are found by identifying stable fixed points of the replicator equations
(S2) and (S3). To obtain vanishing right-hand sides of these equations, we must have that ψ(A,E) =
0 for all but one action A in each environment E, and that φ(R,A) = 0 for all but one reaction R to
each action A. Thus, only homogeneous populations are fixed points of the replicator equations. The
only exception to this is when multiple fitnesses have the same value: then one has neutral stability
in mixed populations. This will rarely be the case in situations of interest to us: even then, stochastic
contributions (not considered here) will tend to lead to a homogeneous population. Hence, only
homogeneous populations can be evolutionarily stable, as stated in the main text.
To determine whether a particular homogeneous population is evolutionarily stable, we need to exam-
ine the behaviour of deviations away from the corresponding fixed point in (S2) and (S3). Ultimately,
we find that the requirement for stability (i.e., that the Hessian matrix evaluated at a fixed point has
negative eigenvalues [6]) is satisfied only if
u(A′, E) < u(A(E), E) ∀A′ 6= A(E) in each environment E (S6)
v(R′, A) < v(R(A), A) ∀R′ 6= R(A) for each action A , (S7)
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R0 U D F
E0 0 −γ −γ −
L −α −α− γ + δ −α− γ −
E −α −α− γ −α− γ + δ −
X −β −β − γ −β − γ −
L ◦E −2α −2α− γ + δ −2α− γ + δ −
Table S1: Growth rates s(R|E) as a function of the behaviour R ∈ {R0,U,D,F} in each envi-
ronmental state E ∈ {E0,L,E,X,L ◦ E}. The idea is that there is a penalty α when one predator
is present, and 2α when both are present; a cost β if food is scarce; a cost of moving away from
predator γ; a benefit δ if the movement away from a predator leads to a greater chance of survival;
and a cost of  for fleeing. It is assumed that all the costs and benefits are cumulative, except for
fleeing which (by taking the agent to a completely new location) is taken to be independent of the
environmental state.
whereA(E) andR(A) specify the actions and reactions performed by all agents in the homogeneous
population of interest. When one of the conditions stated above does not hold, the population is
vulnerable to an instability. For example, at a fixed point where the population has the rule E → A1,
it would be vulnerable to reverting to the default action E → A0, if u(A0, E) > u(A1, E) when
evaluated at the fixed point corresponding to homogeneous use of the rule E → A1. The principles
stated in the main text are obtained by investigating the situations under which different homogeneous
fixed points are stable or, if they are unstable, what the nature of the instabilities are.
2 Case study of the principles for the emergence of combinatorial com-
munication: Putty-nosed monkeys
We illustrate the general principles for the emergence of combinatorial communication set out in the
main text with the concrete example of the putty-nosed monkey’s communication system. To recap,
there are three basic environmental states that are relevant to communication: L, where leopards
are present; E, where eagles are present; and X, in which food is scarce. We assume that the
optimal behaviour in these environmental states is U, to move up, D, to move down, and F, to
flee, respectively. We also assume that the only composite state that may exist is presence of both
predators L ◦E, and that the optimal response in this environment is to flee (F), since moving away
from one of the predators (U orD) will inevitably entail moving towards from one of the predators.
Taking into account the default environment E0 and the default reaction R0, we find that even this
simple model has twenty different growth rates s(R|E). To keep the parameters to a manageable
number, we introduce a set of costs α, β, γ and  which relate to the presence of a predator, the
absence of food, moving away from a predator and fleeing respectively, and a benefit δ for moving
away from a predator. Combining these costs additively leads to the set of growth rates specified in
Table S1. In addition to these growth rates, we must also specify the costs η and χ for maintaining
components of a communication system, and the frequencies f(E) with which the various envi-
ronmental states are present. Again, for simplicity, we assume that leopards and eagles are equally
frequent, f(L) = f(E).
To complete the definition of the model, we specify three actions R,G and B that we construe as
different colours (rather than sounds like ‘pyow’ and ’hack’), and the single composite actionR◦G.
We now demonstrate how principles 2 and 3 stated in the main text allow us to understand the
constraints on reaching the actual communication system exhibited by putty-nosed monkeys (i.e.,
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f(E0) f(L) f(E) f(L ◦E) f(X) α β γ δ  χ η
0.38 0.2 0.2 0.07 0.15 1.5 2.6 1.0 1.3 2.1 0.05 0.05
Table S2: Parameters used in direct numerical integration of the system of ODEs (S2) and (S3).
the signals L → R → U, E → G → U and X → R ◦G → F) from a simpler system. Since
one needs at least two signals to create a composite signal, we consider starting points whereby two
signals have separately evolved. There are two distinct starting points: (A) one in which one of the
predator signals is present alongside the food signal, i.e., L → R → U (or E → G → U which is
equivalent, due to the symmetry in the predators we have built into this model) and X → B → F;
and (B) one in which both predator signals are present, i.e., L → R → U and E → G → U. Note
that in the former case, there was no option other than to use the non-composite action B to act as a
cue for the absence of food.
Principle 2 in the main text states that given starting point (A), the only way that a new signal can
be added is by some external trigger: if the system (A) is unstable, it can be unstable only to losing
existing actions or reactions, rather than by adding a new action or reaction, since these necessarily
incur a cost η or χ respectively to no benefit. The only way a more complex system can be constructed
in this case is the additional of a new signal by an external trigger. The only signal absent from (A) is
the remaining predator signal. This leads to a system in which all three non-composite environmental
states map to distinct non-composite actions, each of which yields a distinct reaction. It is possible
that once this second predator signal is added, ritualisation of the actionR ◦G→ F may occur due
toR◦G being performed in the composite state L◦E, and because the flee reaction is optimal in the
presence of both predators. This leads to the establishment of a pseudo-composite signal within the
classification scheme outlined in the main text. For the set of model parameters given in Table S2,
we find that this is exactly what happens: see Figure S1 which shows the results of direct numerical
integration of the ODE system (S2) and (S3) under these conditions.
Now we consider starting point (B). Principle 3 in the main text states that this starting point may
be vulnerable to the emergence of a composite signal without any external triggering. As we further
discuss in the main text, this is permitted when the system comprising three non-composite signals
is unstable. In particular, this is true for the combination of parameter values given in Table S2.
Figure S2 shows that ritualisation ofR◦G→ F is followed by sensory manipulation ofX→ R◦G,
generating the putty-nosed monkey’s communication system without the need for an external trigger.
On the other hand, when the non-composite signalling system is stable, this pathway is suppressed
and the starting point (B) is expected to be stable, even if the system with a fully-composite signal
is also stable (and therefore, in principle, a possible endpoint of the dynamics). Direct numerical
integration of (S2) and (S3) under these conditions shows no change in strategy frequencies over
time, indicating that the two-signal system (B) is stable in this case, and further signals can be added
only by means of an external trigger. As we argue in the main text, the most likely scenario is that
the stable system of three non-composite signals will be reached through such a mechanism, rather
than the system with a composite signal, even though that is also stable.
This simple example thus demonstrates two constraints on the trigger-free emergence of fully-composite
signals: (i) in order for a composite action to be used as a cue for an unrelated environmental state, no
other action may be in use as part of a signal for that state; and (ii) the system in which the unrelated
environmental state is signalled by an non-composite action must in itself be unstable.
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Figure S1: Ritualisation of a pseudo-composite signal from a system of three non-composite signals
in the absence of an external trigger. The left panel shows the frequencies ψ(A,E) of relevant action
strategies; the right panel shows the frequencies of φ(R,A) of relevant reaction strategies. These
were obtained obtained by direct numerical integration of the system (S2) and (S3) with the set of
model parameters given in Table S2.
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Figure S2: Evolution of a fully-composite signal from a system of two non-composite signals in the
absence of an external trigger. This is achieved first by ritualisation of R ◦G → F which creates
a state that is then vulnerable to sensory manipulation of X → R ◦ G. The left panel shows the
frequencies ψ(A,E) of relevant action strategies; the right panel shows the frequencies of φ(R,A)
of relevant reaction strategies. These were obtained obtained by direct numerical integration of the
system (S2) and (S3) with the set of model parameters given in Table S2.
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